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1 Introduction
The question whether monetary policy should be forward-looking, i.e. based on fore-
casts of future inflation and other variables, has raised debates in the recent research into
monetary policy making. On one hand, empirical evidence on Germany, Japan and the
US since 1979 provided by (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1998) suggests that central banks
are forward looking in practice. More general discussions also pose the question whether
central banks should focus attention to economic fundamentals or “follow the markets”,
which “sometimes stray far from fundamentals”, see pp. 60-61 of (Blinder 1998). Bank
of England Inflation Reports, see (Bank of England 2003), discuss private sector forecasts
while the June and December Issues of the Monthly Bulletin of the European Central
Bank, see (European Central Bank 2003), present both internal macroeconomic projec-
tions and forecasts by other institutions. However, the precise role of these forecasts in
the decision making of these central banks is not revealed.
On the other hand, theoretical studies have shown that the conduct of optimal mone-
tary policy on the part of the bank can lead to a choice of the instrument, the short-term
nominal interest rate, which reacts to the next period forecast of inflation and/or out-
put gap, see (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) for a survey of the recent literature. This
conclusion can nevertheless be problematic as monetary policy rules, both some formu-
lations of optimal setting of the instrument as well as Taylor rules based on forecasts of
inflation and/or output gap, are subject to two potentially important diﬃculties.
First, some interest rate rules lead to indeterminacy of equilibria, see. e.g. (Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler 1999), (Bernanke and Woodford 1997), (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and
(Evans and Honkapohja 2003b). Under indeterminacy, the economy has multiple sta-
tionary rational expectations equilibria (REE), which can include undesirable outcomes.
Second, the problem of instability under learning can also arise depending on the
form of the interest rate rule, see (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Evans and Honkapohja
2003b). If the economy is not stable under learning, small displacements of expectations
away from rational expectations (RE) will lead to volatility as the economy does not
return to the REE when agents try to correct their forecast functions. Both of these
problems can be avoided by careful design of monetary policy, i.e. the interest rate rule.
In the literature just cited, the forecasts refer to those of the private sector, see e.g.
(Hall and Mankiw 1994) for a discussion of targeting of private forecasts. By consid-
ering both determinacy and stability under learning, (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b)
forcefully make a case for incorporating private forecasts of inflation and output gap
into the interest rate rule as the reaction function of the optimal central bank behav-
ior under discretion.1 Naturally, for such a proposal to make sense it is required that
the private sector forecasts are observable. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) show that
small measurement errors would not lead to large deviations from optimality. However,
(Orphanides 2003) and others have argued that there are large errors in private fore-
casts. While private forecasts by diﬀerent institutions are regularly published, it is not
1(Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) extend the results of (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) to the case of
commitment.
2
self-evident that these published numbers accurately represent the expectations of the
private sector that are relevant for the key private economic decisions. Thus the observ-
ability problems might in fact be more serious than they appear at first sight. Moreover,
if it becomes known that the decisions of the monetary policy maker depend significantly
on the forecasts by private institutions, these institutions might alter their forecasts in
a strategic way so as to influence the decisions about the conducted monetary policy, so
that the central bank may wish to use internal forecasts in its policy making.
The preceding arguments make a case for the use of internal forecasts by the central
bank as a proxy for private forecasts in monetary policy decisions. Moreover, it seems
likely that internal forecasts, rather than those of other institutions, play the central role
in actual monetary policy decisions. The recent literature by (Bernanke and Woodford
1997), (Svensson 1997), (Svensson 1999), (Svensson and Woodford 2003) and (Svensson
2003) incorporates internal forecasts by the central bank in models of monetary policy.
We will focus on the situation in which both the private sector and the central bank
use their own forecasts in their decision-making and the forecasts are not available to the
other agent. Consequently, the forecasts have no strategic role. This case can be seen as
a natural benchmark. Taking the learning viewpoint, we will argue that heterogenous
forecasting by the private sector and the central bank poses a new stability concern that
needs to be taken into account in policy design.
The learning approach to modelling expectations formation has gained popularity
in the recent literature.2 The economic agents are assumed to use forecast functions
that depend on some parameters and, at any moment of time, the economic decisions
are made on the basis of expectations/forecasts obtained from these functions. The
values of the parameters in the forecast functions and the expectations of the agents
are adjusted over time as new data becomes available. Following much of the literature,
we will assume that parameter updating is done using standard econometric methods
such as recursive least squares (RLS) estimation. We see this approach as a natural
first formulation, but it can be noted that other approaches to learning could also be
considered in this context.3
A key issue of interest is whether this kind of adaptive learning behavior converges
to REE over time. If this is the case, the forecast functions of the agents are eventually
those associated with the REE. We will analyze the implications of heterogeneity in
private sector and central bank forecasts for the performance of forward-looking interest
rate rules.4 Our objective is to study how the conditions for learnability of equilibrium,
2There has recently been extensive research into the learning approach to macroeconomics, see
(Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for a systematic treatise. Overviews and surveys are provided e.g. by
(Evans and Honkapohja 1999) , (Marimon 1997), (Sargent 1993) and (Sargent 1999).
3The other approaches include computational intelligence (see e.g. (Arifovic 1998)), models of dis-
crete predictor choice (see e.g. (Brock and Hommes 1997) and (Brock and de Fontnouvelle 2000)) and
eductive learning (see (Guesnerie 2002)).
4The earlier literature on learning and monetary policy has largely assumed that only private
forecasts aﬀect the economy. See (Bullard and Mitra 2002), (Bullard and Mitra 2001), (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b), (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001), (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) and (Mitra 2003).
(Carlstrom and Fuerst 2001) study the standard model of monetary policy under the assumption that
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i.e. stability of equilibrium under adaptive learning, are aﬀected by heterogeneities in
expectations and learning rules. The model we use is standard in the recent literature on
monetary policy conducted with interest rates rules, see the surveys by (Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler 1999) and (Woodford 1999).
The heterogeneity in expectations and learning can take some diﬀerent forms even if
attention is restricted to econometric learning. The first and simplest possibility is that
both private sector and central bank forecast functions have the same parametric form
and the updating of these forecast functions is done using the same learning algorithm.
(We specifically assume the RLS algorithm that has been widely used in the literature.)
Heterogeneity in expectations is then solely due to diﬀerences in initial beliefs.
The second step we consider relaxes the assumption of identical estimation algo-
rithms. One subcase here is that the updating algorithms are in the same class, but the
strength of reaction to forecast errors in parameter updating diﬀers between the private
sector and the central bank. Another subcase arises when the algorithms used by the
private agents and the policy maker are diﬀerent. For example, the private sector might
use the stochastic gradient (SG) algorithm that is simpler to implement than RLS.5
The analysis of learning dynamics in the context of monetary policies provides a very
natural setting in which adaptive learning can take place under structural heterogeneity.
We say that a model exhibits structural heterogeneity when diﬀerent agents respond
diﬀerently to expectations; compare p. 42 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). In the
model of monetary policy the private sector expectations influence the economy directly
through aggregate demand and the new Phillips curves, while the central bank forecasts
enter through the interest rate rule. Our analysis make use of the general theoreti-
cal results for forward-looking multivariate linear models with structural heterogeneity
derived in the companion paper (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003).
We will show that the learnability restrictions for interest rate rules under the as-
sumption of homogenous expectations continue to be important. They are a necessary
condition for convergence of adaptive learning with heterogenous forecasts and learning
rules. However, these conditions need not be suﬃcient for learnability. We look system-
atically at additional conditions that might lead to stability or instability. Interestingly,
these results have natural interpretations as suggestions concerning the forecasting ac-
tivity of the central bank.
private sector has rational expectations and the Central Bank tries to learn. Learning and monetary
policy has been recently surveyed in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a).
5These forms of heterogeneity in learning are studied in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) for a general
framework. In independent work (Giannitsarou 2003) considers similar cases under the more restrictive
assumption that the economy depends on the average expectations of the agents.
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2 The Model and First Results
2.1 Analytical Framework
The analysis will be conducted using a standard model with a representative consumer
and monopolistic competition in markets for diﬀerentiated products. It is assumed that
firms face restrictions on price changes, so that only a fraction of firms can change its
price in any given period. Real balances enter the utility function of the consumer, who
can also make savings in the form of government bonds. We employ directly the log-
linearized model and thus adopt the framework that is formally as outlined in Section
2 of the survey paper by (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999). (See e.g. (Woodford 1996)
for the nonlinear model and its log-linearized version.) We clearly need a specific model
and we emphasize that our approach is applicable to the very similar frameworks that
have been used in the recent literature.
The structural model consists of two equations:
zt = −ϕ(it − EˆPt πt+1) + EˆPt zt+1 + gt, (1)
πt = λzt + βEˆPt πt+1 + ut, (2)
where zt is the “output gap”, i.e. the diﬀerence between actual and potential output, πt
is the inflation rate, i.e. the proportional rate of change in the price level from t−1 to t,
and it is the nominal interest rate. Eˆ
P
t πt+1 and Eˆ
P
t zt+1 denote private sector expectations
of inflation and output gap next period. We will use the same notation without the “ˆ”
and superscript P to denote RE of the private sector. All the parameters in (1) and (2)
are positive. 0 < β < 1 is the discount rate of the representative firm.
(1) is a dynamic “IS” curve that can be derived from the Euler equation associated
with the household’s savings decision. (2) is a “new Phillips curve” that can be derived
from optimal pricing decisions of monopolistically competitive firms facing constraints
on the frequency of future price changes. (1) and (2) are the key behavioral relationships
indicating that consumers and firms need to predict future inflation and output gap in
order to make their current consumption and pricing decisions. Thus consumers and
firms will try to learn the stochastic process of πt and zt.
ut and gt denote observable shocks following first order autoregressive processes:µ
ut
gt
¶
= F
µ
ut−1
gt−1
¶
+
µ
u˜t
g˜t
¶
, F =
µ
ρ 0
0 µ
¶
, (3)
where 0 < µ < 1, 0 < ρ < 1 and g˜t ∼ iid(0,σ2g), u˜t ∼ iid(0,σ2u). The demand shock
gt may be rationalized as a preference shock or as expected changes in government
purchases relative to expected changes in potential output. The “cost push” shock ut
captures features that aﬀect expected marginal costs other than those through zt.
We supplement equations (1) and (2) with monetary policy that is conducted by
means of control of the nominal interest rate it.
6 We focus on rules where the interest
6It should be noted that we have left out explicit consideration of the intertemporal government
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rate is adjusted in accordance with the central bank expectations EˆCBt (.) of output gap
and inflation next period and possibly the exogenous shocks. Then
it = χ0 + χπEˆ
CB
t πt+1 + χzEˆ
CB
t zt+1 + χggt + χuut. (4)
Again the same notation without the “ˆ” and superscript CB will denote RE (of the
central bank). We assume χz ≥ 0 and χπ ≥ 0 throughout the paper.
The rule (4) can be interpreted as a Taylor rule considered, for instance, in (Bullard
and Mitra 2002). (The term “Taylor rule” is used to commonly refer to non-optimal
rules.) Formally similar rules can also arise from optimal policy on the part of the central
bank.7 As there can be large errors in measuring private expectations or these might be
subject to strategic behavior, a plausible procedure would use the internal forecasts by
the central bank in place of the private sector expectations. This suggests the rule
it = [1 + (λ
2 + α)−1ϕ−1λβ]EˆCBt πt+1 + ϕ
−1EˆCBt zt+1 (5)
+ϕ−1gt + (λ
2 + α)−1ϕ−1λut,
where α is the relative weight for output deviations in the central bank’s objective
function, see footnote 7. Following (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b), we will refer to (5)
as the expectations based (EB-) optimal rule. The optimal interest rate under discretion
can be characterized in diﬀerent ways, as pointed out in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999).
Their suggestion, coupled with internal forecasting, is
it = (1 +
(1− ρ)λ
ραϕ
)EˆCBt πt+1 + ϕ
−1gt. (6)
We will refer to (6) as the rational expectations (RE-) optimal rule as in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b). Clearly, (5) and (6) are special cases of (4). Note that (5) and
(6) presuppose that the central bank knows the structural parameters ϕ and λ. We
make this assumption for simplicity; see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) for learning of
structural parameters by the central bank when private expectations are observable.
As mentioned before, (Bullard and Mitra 2002) assume identical forecasts to derive
conditions for (local) stability of fundamental or minimal state variable (MSV) solutions
under learning dynamics. Bullard and Mitra found that the MSV solution is learnable
if and only if it satisfies the Taylor principle, which is formally defined as
χπ +
1− β
λ
χz > 1 (7)
in our model. (See (Woodford 2003) and (Bullard and Mitra 2002), p.1116 for details on
the Taylor principle.) Regarding optimal rules, (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) found
budget constraint. This is appropriate only if fiscal policy in the form of lump-sum taxes is passively
adjusted in the sense of (Leeper 1991), so that taxes are set to ensure fulfillment of the intertemporal
government budget constraint.
7(Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) consider optimal discretionary policy by minimizing a quadratic
objective function, αz2t + π2t , subject to general private sector expectations and (2), which approach
leads to a specific interest rate rule that depend on private expectations.
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that, with private expectations, the rule (5) yields both stability under learning and
determinacy whereas rule (6) is stable but leads to indeterminacy in some parameter
domains.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the robustness of these results to the het-
erogeneity in forecasts and/or learning algorithms for the private sector and the central
bank. Our model, therefore, comprises of equations (1), (2), and (3) supplemented with
the interest rate rule (4). We thus substitute equation (4) into (1) and write the above
system in the general form
yt = D +A
P EˆPt yt+1 +A
CBEˆCBt yt+1 +Bwt, (8)
wt = Fwt−1 + vt,
where
AP =
µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶
, ACB =
µ
−ϕχz −ϕχπ
−λϕχz −λϕχπ
¶
B =
µ
−ϕχu 1− ϕχg
1− λϕχu λ(1− ϕχg)
¶
,D =
µ
−ϕχ0
−λϕχ0
¶
and yt = (zt,πt)0, wt = (ut, gt)0, vt = (u˜t, g˜t)0.
We will consider learnability of the minimal state variable (MSV) solution for the
model (8). It takes the form
yt = a+ bwt, (9)
where a, b are to be computed in terms of the structural parameters of the model.8
Proposition 1 of (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) shows that the MSV solution is generically
unique:
Proposition 1 The model of monetary policy (8), has a unique MSV solution of the
form (9) if the matrices I − (AP +ACB) and I − F 0 ⊗ (AP +ACB) are invertible.
2.2 Heterogenous Forecasts Under Homogenous Learning Rules
As a first case we assume that the central bank and the private sector have diﬀerent
forecasts although their forecast functions take the same general form and they use
asymptotically identical learning algorithms in updating the parameters of their forecast
functions. Note that the forecasts of the private sector and the central bank will diﬀer
along the actual time path since the learning rules can start with diﬀerent initial beliefs
and the gain sequences can diﬀer for finite time. It is well known for a wide variety of
diﬀerent models (with homogenous forecasts and learning) that convergence to the REE
obtains if and only if certain stability conditions, known as expectational stability (or
8There are other stationary REE in addition to the MSV solution if the model is indeterminate. See
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) for analysis of indeterminacy in the model of monetary policy.
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E-stability) conditions, are satisfied, see e.g. (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). We now
obtain the extended E-stability conditions that govern convergence of the economy to the
REE under real time learning as long as the bank and private agents use asymptotically
identical versions of RLS. (This result is discussed in more detail in the companion paper
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2003).)
The private agents and the central bank are assumed to have their own perceived
laws of motion (PLM) that take the same parametric form (9) as the REE of interest.
For given values of the parameters of the PLM and the current values of the exogenous
variables, the agents use the estimated PLM to make forecasts about the values of
the endogenous variables next period. Given the forecasts a temporary equilibrium of
the economy, also called the actual law of motion (ALM) obtains. We note that this
formulation of forecasting by the private agents and the central bank is a natural first
approach, since the forecast functions correspond, under specific parameter values, to
the equilibrium forecast functions. However, we do acknowledge that they represent a
greatly simplified view of actual forecasting practices.
Formally, the private sector and the central bank, respectively, have PLMs of the form
that corresponds to the MSV solutions (9) but they have diﬀerent parameter values:
yt = a
P + bPwt = (φ
P )0xt (10)
yt = a
CB + bCBwt = (φ
CB)0xt (11)
with corresponding forecast functions9
EˆPt yt+1 = a
P + bPFwt, (12)
EˆCBt yt+1 = a
CB + bCBFwt, (13)
where xt = (1, wt)
0 is a vector of variables relevant in forecasting and (φi)0 = (ai, bi),
with ai a 2−dimensional vector and bi an 2× 2 matrix for i = P,CB. We remark that
constant terms are incorporated in (10)-(11) since it is natural to assume that agents
also need to estimate intercepts; see (Bullard and Mitra 2002), p. 1118, for further
discussion.
Inserting these forecasts into the model (8), one obtains the ALM followed by inflation
and output as
yt = D +A
PaP +ACBaCB + [(AP bP +ACBbCB)F +B]wt
= [D +APaP +ACBaCB, (AP bP +ACBbCB)F +B]
·
1
wt
¸
≡ T (ϕ01,ϕ02)xt.
From this ALM it is easy to construct the explicit form of the mapping T (ϕ01,ϕ
0
2) from
the PLM to the ALM. We look at E-stability of the REE in which the bank and the
9Parameter estimates are assumed to depend on data up to t − 1 but the current observation on
exogenous variables is used in the forecasts. This is commonly done in the literature. For simplicity, F
is assumed to be known (if not, it could be estimated).
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private sector have identical forecasts, that is when aP = aCB = a¯ and bP = bCB = b¯.
The REE is said to be E-stable if it is a locally asymptotically stable fixed point under
diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(ϕ01,ϕ
0
2) = T (ϕ
0
1,ϕ
0
2)− (ϕ01,ϕ02),
which explicitly is (here I denotes the identity matrix)
daP/dτ = D + (AP − I)aP +ACBaCB,
dbP/dτ = AP bPF − bP +ACBbCBF +B,
daCB/dτ = D +APaP + (ACB − I)aCB,
dbCB/dτ = AP bPF +ACBbCBF − bCB +B.
This system is linear and the equations for (aP , aCB) and (bP , bCB) are independent
from each other. Using the results in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003), stability for the
(aP , aCB) and (bP , bCB) subsystems are determined, respectively, by the matricesµ
AP − I ACB
AP ACB − I
¶
,
µ
F ⊗AP − I F ⊗ACB
F ⊗AP F ⊗ACB − I
¶
,
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product. Consequently, the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for E-stability are that the eigenvalues of
AP +ACB − I and F ⊗ (AP +ACB)− I
have negative real parts. (We assume that the case of zero real parts does not arise.)
These requirements for stability are exactly the E-stability condition when the bank
and the private sector have identical forecasts. In this case EˆPt yt+1 = Eˆ
CB
t yt+1 and the
matrix in front of the common expectations EˆPt yt+1 in (8) becomes A
P + ACB. Since
the matrix F in (3) is diagonal and has positive elements (i.e. µ > 0 and ρ > 0),
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability in fact reduce to the condition
that the eigenvalues of AP + ACB − I have negative real parts, as shown in (Bullard
and Mitra 2002). Finally, their Proposition 5 shows that the E-stability condition is
equivalent to the Taylor principle (formally, their model has only one shock but this
does not aﬀect the results). We have thus verified:
Proposition 2 The MSV solution to the model of monetary policy (8) is E-stable un-
der heterogenous forecasts if and only if the corresponding model with homogenous ex-
pectations is E-stable. The E-stability condition is that the eigenvalues of the matrix
AP +ACB − I have negative real parts, which is equivalent to the Taylor principle.
We note that under some (mild) regularity conditions, the RLS algorithm will con-
verge to an E-unstable symmetric (MSV) solution with probability zero. See (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001) for these details.
Proposition 2 shows that the stability conditions obtained in the homogenous case in
(Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) are not as restrictive as
they might seem. The assumption that the bank and private sector have the same type
of forecast functions and same learning algorithms serves as a good first approximation.
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3 Heterogenous Learning Rules
The preceding stability result allowed for diﬀerent forecasts for the central bank and
private agents but assumed that the bank and private sector use learning rules that
were asymptotically identical (even though these rules diﬀered along the transition to
REE). A greater degree of heterogeneity would allow for learning rules that diﬀer even
asymptotically or for altogether diﬀerent learning algorithms. Here we take up these
two further forms of heterogeneity.
The first subcase assumes that both the bank and the private agents use versions of
RLS in their updating schemes but they diﬀer in the degree of adaption to forecast errors.
This allows for inertia in the formation of expectations as well as various weighting
schemes for data in later periods relative to early ones.
The second subcase considers a scenario where the agents use diﬀerent learning rules.
The rules we consider are RLS and SG type algorithms. These algorithms involve a
trade-oﬀ between simplicity and eﬃciency (see Section 3.2 for further discussion).
3.1 RLS Learning with Diﬀerent Gain Sequences
We continue to assume that the private sector and the bank use forecast functions (12)-
(13) in forming their forecasts of inflation and output. Consequently, the analysis of
E-stability is identical to that in Section 2.2. However, the analysis of real time learning
is diﬀerent since we now allow the bank and the private sector to display diﬀerent speeds
of adaption in their updating of estimates of parameters.
Versions of the RLS algorithm take the form
(φit)
0 = (φit−1)
0 + γi,t(R
i
t)
−1xt−1(yt−1 − φit−1xt−1)0 (14)
Rit = R
i
t−1 + γi,t[xt−1(xt−1)
0 −Rit−1],
for i = P,CB, where we have used the notation in equation (10) from the preceding
section. The first equation describes the updating of the parameters of the PLM of the
private sector and the central bank, while the second equation updates the matrix of
second moments of xt that is needed in the updating of the PLM parameters. As already
noted, the estimation of parameters for time t is based on information available in t− 1
but forecasts use current data.
The sequence γi,t, i = P,CB is known as the sequence of gains. The gain sequences
can diﬀer even asymptotically, and our interest is in the implications of heterogeneity
in the form of diﬀerent gain sequences of the central bank and private agents. The
gain sequence indicates how much weight, say, the private agent puts on forecast errors
yt−1 − φPt−1xt−1 when he updates the parameters of the PLM. For standard RLS it is
given by γi,t = t
−1. Modifications to standard RLS can be obtained by permitting
greater or smaller response than t−1 to the forecast errors, adjusted for by the matrix of
second moments and the state of exogenous variables. It is possible to include various
weighting schemes, inertia in updating of forecast rules and even independent random
fluctuations in adaption speeds, see e.g. (Ljung and So¨derstro¨m 1983), (Marcet and
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Sargent 1989) and (Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon 2001) for diﬀerent possibilities
and the companion paper (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) for further discussion.10 We
assume throughout the paper that agents perceive their environment to be stationary
as the gain sequences are taken to be decreasing, i.e. limt→∞ γi,t = 0. Reformulation
of the learning to allow e.g. for structural shifts raises many further issues that are not
taken into account for reasons of brevity.11
We write the (possibly random) gain sequences in the form
γP,t = γt(γP,tγ
−1
t ) and γCB,t = γt(γCB,tγ
−1
t ),
where γt is an exogenously given, nonincreasing deterministic sequence satisfying certain
properties. The diﬀerent asymptotics are captured by assuming that
E(γP,tγ
−1
t )→ δP and E(γCB,tγ−1t )→ δCB, as t→∞ with δP 6= δCB.
Here the mathematical expectations are taken over the possible independent randomness
in the individual gains.
The results in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) imply that local convergence of learning
under these algorithms is determined by the following two matricesµ
δP (AP − I) δPACB
δCBAP δCB(ACB − I)
¶
(15)
=
µ
δP I 0
0 δCBI
¶µ
AP − I ACB
AP ACB − I
¶
and µ
δP (F ⊗AP − I) δPF ⊗ACB
δCBF ⊗AP δCB(F ⊗ACB − I)
¶
(16)
=
µ
δP I 0
0 δCBI
¶µ
F ⊗AP − I F ⊗ACB
F ⊗AP F ⊗ACB − I
¶
,
and we state the formal convergence result:
Proposition 3 If the private sector and the central bank use modified RLS learning
algorithms with diﬀerent gain sequences, then learning converges locally if the matrices
(15) and (16) have eigenvalues with negative real parts.
We note that if the gain sequences are the same asymptotically, i.e. δP = δCB, the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for convergence to the MSV solutions is given by the
E-stability conditions. However, the situation is quite diﬀerent if δP 6= δCB. The stability
conditions are in general aﬀected by the relative size of the gain parameters, though the
earlier E-stability condition is still relevant, as we now show.
10See also Section 15.2 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for discussion of gain sequences. Inertia in the
formation of expectations is observed in experimental data, see for instance (Marimon and Sunder 1993)
and (Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon 2001).
11Constant gain algorithms, for which γi,t is a small positive constant, are a natural way for allowing
for the possibility of structural shifts; see e.g. Chapter 14 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) and (Cho,
Williams, and Sargent 2002).
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3.1.1 Stability and Instability Conditions for Interest Rate Rules
The first substantive result that follows from Proposition 3 concerns the general form
of interest rate policies (4). We first provide some necessary conditions that must be
satisfied for an equilibrium to be locally stable under learning. The next corollary is
proved in Appendix A.1.
Corollary 4 Consider model (8) and assume that the private sector and the central
bank use the algorithms (14) with diﬀerent gain sequences. The two conditions
(1− β)χz + λ(χπ − 1) > 0, (17)
χz + λχπ − δP δ−1CB[λ− ϕ−1(1− β + δ−1P δCB)] > 0 (18)
are necessary for local stability of the symmetric equilibrium under learning.
Note that (17) is precisely the Taylor principle (7) that completely characterized
stability under learning for the homogenous case considered in (Bullard and Mitra 2002).
Corollary 4 shows the continued importance of the Taylor principle in the presence of
heterogenous rules. In particular, it shows that rules violating this principle continue to
be unstable as is the case under homogenous forecasts.
However, the Taylor principle is in general not suﬃcient for stability under learning
since condition (18) depends on δ−1P δCB. The interest rule may require a stronger response
to inflation and/or output (via larger χπ or χz) than what is dictated by the Taylor
principle, especially for small values of δ−1P δCB. To illustrate this, assume that β+λϕ >
1.12 Then, if χz = 0, the necessary condition (18) requires χπ > δP δ
−1
CB[1− λ−1ϕ−1(1−
β + δ−1P δCB)], which is strictly more than 1, for any δ
−1
P δCB < (β + λϕ− 1)(1 + λϕ)−1.
It turns out that the Taylor principle is necessary and suﬃcient for stability when
δ−1P δCB ≥ 1. Intuitively, this last requirement means that the central bank should put
at least as much weight on incoming information about the economy when revising its
parameter estimates as does the private sector. The next corollary is also proved in
Appendix A.1.
Corollary 5 Consider model (8) when the private sector and the central bank use mod-
ified RLS learning algorithms with diﬀerent gain sequences and assume that
δ−1P δCB ≥ 1.
The dynamics of the economy is then locally stable under learning if and only if the
Taylor principle (7) holds.
12This parameter restriction will typically be satisfied since the discount factor β is assumed to be
close to 1. For example, the restriction is satisfied for the calibrated values in both (Woodford 1999)
and (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000).
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A common theme that emerged from (Bullard and Mitra 2002) for a variety of interest
rate rules is that a strong enough response towards inflation or output always resulted in
stability under learning dynamics. Corollary 5 shows this to be true when δ−1P δCB ≥ 1.13
On the other hand, Corollary 4 suggests that policies satisfying the Taylor principle
can sometimes lead to instability. This can indeed happen if the bank puts much less
weight on incoming information about the economy than the private sector (i.e. if δCB
is much smaller than δP ). This can be seen informally by examining the left-hand side
of (15). We can writeµ
δP (AP − I) δPACB
δCBAP δCB(ACB − I)
¶
= δP
µ
AP − I ACB
δ−1P δCBA
P δ−1P δCB(A
CB − I)
¶
, (19)
so that, if δ−1P δCB is suﬃciently small, half of the eigenvalues of the matrix (19) are
approximately equal to zero while the other half are approximately the eigenvalues of
AP − I. The latter set contains an eigenvalue with positive real part. This intuition is
made rigorous below in the result:
Corollary 6 Consider model (8) when the private sector and the central bank use mod-
ified RLS learning algorithms with diﬀerent gain sequences and assume that β+λϕ > 1.
If
δ−1P δCB <
β + λϕ− 1
1 + ϕ(χz + λχπ)
, (20)
the dynamics of the economy is locally unstable under learning.
The proof is immediate by making a strict reversal of condition (18). As mentioned
before, the parameter restriction β + λϕ > 1 is very often satisfied since β is close to 1.
Corollary 6 points to the danger of instability even for interest rules satisfying the Taylor
principle when the central bank does not put enough weight on the forecast errors while
revising its parameter estimates. The general intuition for the result is as follows.
One observes from the model (8) that, while the central bank has a stabilizing ef-
fect, the private sector has a de-stabilizing influence on the economy. Inspection of the
matrices AP and ACB makes it clear that if private sector expectations of inflation (or
output) deviate upward from the RE value, then actual inflation (and output) increase,
which leads, ceteris paribus, to upward revisions of both EˆPt πt+1 and Eˆ
P
t zt+1 (note that
all the entries of AP are positive). On the other hand, if the central bank’s expecta-
tions EˆCBt πt+1 or Eˆ
CB
t zt+1 deviate upwards from the RE value, πt and zt fall, which
tends to guide the bank’s non-rational expectations towards the RE values as all the
entries of ACB are negative. More formally, one observes that the eigenvalues of ACB are
non-positive, while the eigenvalues of AP are positive and one of them exceeds 1. The
13It can be shown that, for any δ−1P δCB (and values of the structural parameters), the symmetric
equilibrium is stable if the central bank is aggressive enough by choosing large values of χz and χπ. For
brevity, we do not formally develop this result.
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eigenvalue exceeding one is the key to understanding our instability results under het-
erogenous forecasts and learning. (This intuition continues to be true when we examine
diﬀerent types of learning rules in Section 3.2.)
Under homogenous forecasts, it is the sum of the matrices AP and ACB that deter-
mined stability under learning dynamics. Pursuit of the Taylor principle by the bank is
then able to guide non-rational expectations of the private sector towards RE. However,
under heterogenous forecasts, this is no longer suﬃcient because of the diﬀerential eﬀects
of the diﬀerent forecasts via AP and ACB and the diﬀerent weights in parameter updat-
ing on πt and zt. It now becomes very important for the bank to put suﬃcient weight
on new data about the exogenous observables while revising its forecasts of inflation and
output, so that, in conjuction with the Taylor principle, its stabilizing influence out-
weighs the de-stabilizing influence of the private sector to render the REE stable. This
makes intuitive sense since, after all, these shocks are indicative of inflationary pressures
in the economy.
The results indicate the degree to which the results in (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and
(Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) are aﬀected by the use of diﬀerential gains by the bank
and the private sector. If δ−1P δCB satisfies the condition in Corollary 6, then the Taylor
principle no longer suﬃces to guarantee convergence. Moreover, even if the central bank
behaves optimally by following the rules (5) or (6), convergence to the equilibrium may
not take place unless the bank makes δ−1P δCB suﬃciently big (say, ≥ 1 as in Corollary 5)
in the updating of the PLM parameters. We illustrate this further in the next subsection.
3.1.2 Robustness of the Rules to Gain Diﬀerentials
Corollary 6 provides only suﬃcient conditions for the learning dynamics to be unstable.
We now use numerical techniques to study to what extent the diﬀerences in learning
actually influence stability for plausible values of structural parameters. As a useful by-
product, we also consider the desirability of diﬀerent optimal interest rate rules (5) and
(6) advocated under the assumption of homogenous forecasts in the previous literature.
We first look at variants of optimal policies considered in Section 2. The two variants
are the EB-optimal rule, equation (5), and the RE-optimal rule, equation (6). (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b) recommend the EB-optimal rule in part on grounds of determinacy:
rule (5) is always determinate under RE, rule (6) can become indeterminate for values of
ρ close to zero. Regarding learnability, (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) show that under
homogenous forecasts and learning, both the rules (5) and (6) are stable under learning.
We now consider the implications of heterogeneity in learning rules for these results by
means of numerical analysis.
Throughout the paper the results reported by Figures 1-7 show domains of specified
parameters for which numerical computation of the eigenvalues of the relevant matri-
ces indicates stability with heterogenous learning. The calibrated parameters values in
(Woodford 1999) are used in this discussion:
Calibrated Example: ϕ = (.157)−1,λ = .024, and β = .99.14
14We have found that our results are in fact robust to the calibrated values in (Clarida, Gali, and
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We allow α to range in the interval (0, 1], which captures the scenarios ranging from
strict inflation targeting (α close to 0) to that of flexible inflation targeting. The ratio
δ−1P δCB is allowed to range in the interval (0, 2]. (Both rules are always stable for all
α ∈ (0, 1) when δ−1P δCB > 2.)
FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the stability region for the EB-optimal rule (5) and the RE-
optimal rule (6), respectively, with the value ρ = .9 for the persistence parameter of the
ut shock, which was used in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000). (The value for µ is not
needed for Figures 1 and 2 as the gt shock is neutralized in these rules.) The height
of the vertical lines indicate stability for the relevant range of δ−1P δCB. The figures are
drawn for a grid search of 0.01 for α. For the EB-optimal rule, we find that for α ∈ (0, 1],
the symmetric equilibrium is stable under learning dynamics whenever δ−1P δCB ≥ 0.2.
Instability can only arise for δ−1P δCB < 0.2. However, for the RE-optimal rule stability is
guaranteed only when δ−1P δCB ≥ 1 whereas most values of δ−1P δCB < 1 lead to instability
for α ∈ (0, 1].We, therefore, find that the EB-optimal rule performs better than the RE-
optimal rule as it yields more robustly stability with diﬀerences in the gain parameters
of the learning rules. (Recall that, with identical forecasting, EB and RE optimal rules
both yield learnability so that the entire region in Figures 1 and 2 is stable in this case.)
FIGURE 3 HERE
Diﬀerences in gain sequences also aﬀect the stability of ad hoc Taylor type rules like
(4) considered in (Bullard and Mitra 2002). Figure 3 plots the stability region of the
rule (4) with χz = 0 and the above calibration. We assume that there is no cost-push
shock ut and that µ = 0.35 as in (Woodford 1999). The horizontal axis indicates values
for χπ while the vertical axis indicates the values for δ
−1
P δCB ∈ (0, 2]. We recall that, in
(Bullard and Mitra 2002), all rules with χπ > 1 are stable under learning. However, for
values of δ−1P δCB < 1 even rules with χπ > 1 can now lead to instability. Stability is
guaranteed for rules satisfying the Taylor principle (i.e. χπ > 1) only when δ
−1
P δCB ≥ 1,
as shown in Corollary 5. Of course, rules with χπ < 1 continue to deliver unstable
dynamics, as shown in Corollary 4. The general message is that, with a Taylor rule in
place, the central bank should put enough weight on incoming information (i.e. make
δ−1P δCB suﬃciently big) to ensure stability of the economy.
3.2 RLS Learning and SG Learning
In this section we consider a diﬀerent form of heterogeneity in the learning rules of the
private agents and the bank. The broad aim is to consider a setting where the bank is
using a learning algorithm that is either more or less sophisticated than the algorithm of
the private sector. Central banks usually devote a large amount of resources in forming
Gertler 2000) who use ϕ = 1, λ = .3 and the same β.
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forecasts of economy-wide variables, see (Romer and Romer 2001). Our analysis in this
section provides an analytical answer to the question whether such actions on the part
of the central bank are justified.
Specifically, we assume that there are two possible types of learning algorithms, the
RLS and the stochastic gradient (SG) algorithms that the private agents or the central
bank might use. The RLS and SG algorithms are very commonly used algorithms in
adaptive control and filtering. The RLS algorithm is somewhat more common than SG
in the economics literature. For parameter estimation of fixed exogenous stochastic pro-
cesses, both the RLS and SG algorithms yield consistent estimates of parameters but the
former in addition possesses some optimality properties.15 However, the SG algorithm is
computationally much simpler than the RLS algorithm and it has an interpretation as a
robust optimal prediction rule; see (Evans, Honkapohja, and Williams 2003) for further
discussion. We re-emphasize that we stay within the framework of econometric learning.
Further ways of modeling the degree of sophistication could naturally be considered if
other types of learning were introduced.
When the central bank uses the SG algorithm, parameter updating takes the form
(φCBt )
0 = (φCBt−1)
0 + γCB,txt−1(yt−1 − φCBt−1xt−1)0, (21)
where we have used the notation in equation (11) from Section 2.2. The main diﬀerence
from the RLS algorithm (14) is that (21) does not involve the matrix of second moments.
The private sector is assumed to use RLS. For simplicity, it is assumed that the gain
sequences are identical, i.e. δP = δCB = 1 in the notation of Section 3.1.
The results in the companion paper (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) show that local
convergence under learning is determined by the following two matricesµ
AP − I ACB
AP ACB − I
¶
, (22)µ
F ⊗AP − I F ⊗ACB
MwF ⊗AP MwF ⊗ACB −Mw ⊗ I
¶
, (23)
when the private sector uses RLS and the central bank uses the SG algorithm. Here
Mw = lim
t→∞
E(wtw
0
t) =
µ
(1− ρ2)−1σ2u 0
0 (1− µ2)−1σ2g
¶
with σ2u = var(u˜t) and σ
2
g = var(g˜t). Formally, we state:
Proposition 7 If the private sector uses RLS and the central bank the SG algorithm,
then learning converges locally if the matrices (22) and (23) have eigenvalues with neg-
ative real parts.
15For instance, if the underlying shock process is iid normal, then the RLS estimator is minimum
variance unbiased. These properties refer to the usual statistical analysis that involves parameter
estimation for exogenous processes.
16
Analogous conditions may be obtained when the private agents use SG learning and the
bank uses RLS by inter-changing the roles of AP and ACB in (22) and (23).
We observe from Proposition 7 that the E-stability conditions continue to be neces-
sary for stability. An application of the results in (Bullard and Mitra 2002) immediately
yields the following necessary condition:
Corollary 8 Consider model (8). If the private sector uses RLS and the central bank
the SG algorithm in their learning rules (or vice versa), the dynamics of the economy is
stable under learning only if λ(χπ − 1) + (1− β)χz > 0.
We, therefore, see that the conclusion that interest rules violating the Taylor principle
are undesirable is quite robust. In particular, such “passive” rules lead to instability
irrespective of whether the central bank uses a sophisticated algorithm like RLS or a
simple algorithm like SG.
However, as is clear from Proposition 7, the E-stability conditions are no longer
suﬃcient for convergence of learning. The learnability conditions are now influenced by
the persistence in the shocks (ρ and µ) and their variances (σ2u and σ
2
g) via the matrix
(23). We also note one result, which is easily seen from (23): If ρ and µ are small enough,
the E-stability conditions are suﬃcient for learning stability irrespective of whether the
private agents use RLS or the SG algorithm. Next, we study in more detail, first, the
situation when the central bank uses the SG algorithm in its updating equations while
the private sector uses RLS and, second, the converse situation when the bank uses RLS
and the private agents SG in the following section.
3.2.1 Bank Uses SG and Private Agents Use RLS
We now consider the situation when the central bank uses the SG algorithm in its
updating equations and the private sector uses RLS. As observed above, the matrices
(22) and (23) need to have eigenvalues with negative real parts for stability.
Since stability of (22) is equivalent to the Taylor principle, we concentrate on the ma-
trix (23). It can be shown (e.g. using Mathematica) that the characteristic polynomial
of the matrix (23) is symmetric in the quantities (ρ,σ2u) and (µ,σ
2
g) of the two shocks ut
and gt, so that w.l.o.g. the relevant stability or instability conditions can be obtained by
considering the case of a single shock, say, gt. Thus, we may formally assume that F is a
scalar µ when examining the eigenvalues of (23). When we obtain stability or instability
conditions in terms of µ and σ2g, it should be kept in mind that the same conditions are
required also for ρ and σ2u.
The next thing to note is that (23) is exactly the same matrix (16) (or (30) in
Appendix A.1) which appears in Section 3.1, if we replace δ−1P δCB by (now the scalar)
Mw (compare (23) and (30)). In other words, with this identification, (23) will have
eigenvalues with negative real parts if and only if (16) has so, given that both δ−1P δCB
and Mw are positive. This observation is useful since we are able to directly apply most
of the results of Section 3.1. Henceforth, for the general interest rate rules (4), we confine
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ourselves to the one shock case, gt, although, as noted, the symmetric conditions in ut
are also needed in the case of two shocks.
By the above arguments, Corollary 5 implies the following:
Corollary 9 Consider model (8). Assume that (1 − µ2)−1σ2g ≥ 1 and that the central
bank uses the SG algorithm while the private sector uses the RLS algorithm in their
learning rules. The dynamics of the economy is then locally stable under learning if and
only if λ(χπ − 1) + (1− β)χz > 0.
We note that the condition σ2g+µ
2 ≥ 1 in Corollary 9 is likely to be easily satisfied for
plausible values of these parameters. For example, the calibrated values in (Woodford
1999) satisfy this condition since µ = 0.35 and σ2g = 3.72. In addition, large enough
values of χz and χπ continue to make the symmetric equilibrium necessarily stable.
As in Corollary 6, the Taylor principle does not guarantee stability under learning
and we consider this further. The following Corollary is proved in Appendix A.2.
Corollary 10 Consider model (8). Assume that the central bank uses the SG algorithm
and the private sector uses the RLS algorithm in their learning rules. Then for all
µ > µ¯ ≡ 2(1 + β + λϕ)−1,16 the dynamics of the economy is unstable under learning if
(1− µ2)−1σ2g <
µ(1 + β + λϕ)− 2
1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ)
. (24)
Roughly, the intuition for Corollaries 9 and 10 is as follows. While the Taylor principle
suﬃces for stability of (22), it does not for (23). From (23) one observes that a large σ2g
enhances the stabilizing influence of the bank (recall that ACB has negative entries only),
which provides intuition for Corollary 9. On the other hand, a small σ2g eﬀectively works
towards eliminating the stabilizing influence of the bank and a large µ (in conjunction
with this) enhances the de-stabilizing influence of the private sector via (23) since AP
has an eigenvalue more than 1. This provides some intuition for Corollary 10. More
formally, the latter is also evident from the fact that in this case half the eigenvalues
of (23) are approximately zero and the other half are approximately the eigenvalues of
F ⊗AP − I and that AP has an eigenvalue more than 1.
Even though Corollary 10 gives theoretical conditions for instability, these conditions
will in general be hard to satisfy for plausible values of parameters. It, therefore, seems
that stability under learning is very likely to obtain when the bank uses the SG algorithm
and subscribes to the Taylor principle in view of Corollary 9.
These results are also borne out by the numerical results for the optimal and Taylor
rules. (We do not provide details, which are available on request from the second author.)
Generally, we find that both the RE-optimal and the EB-optimal rules lead to stability
under learning provided that σ2g is not very small. However, instability arises for small
enough values of σ2g and relatively large values of µ, as expected from the discussion
16We note that µ¯ ≈ 0.93 with the Woodford values and is approximately 0.87 with the Clarida et al
values.
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above. Nevertheless, the EB-optimal rule continues to be more robust than the RE-
optimal rule in the sense that it delivers a stable economy for a larger domain of values
of µ and σ2g. In addition, rules fulfilling the Taylor principle yield stability as long as σ
2
g
(or σ2u, by symmetry) are not too small.
3.2.2 Bank Uses RLS and Private Agents Use SG
We now consider the converse situation when the central bank uses RLS and the private
sector the SG algorithm. In this case we need (22) andµ
F ⊗ACB − I F ⊗AP
MwF ⊗ACB MwF ⊗AP −Mw ⊗ I
¶
(25)
to have eigenvalues with negative real parts for stability.
We first show that the Taylor principle continues to completely characterize stability
for interest rules under certain conditions as shown in the next corollary, which is proved
in Appendix A.3.
Corollary 11 Consider model (8). Let the central bank use RLS and the private sector
the SG algorithm in their learning rules. Assume the following two conditions
1 ≤ (1− µ2)−1σ2g,
µ ≤ 2−1µ¯ = (1 + β + λϕ)−1,
with µ¯ as in Corollary 10. Then the symmetric equilibrium is locally stable under learning
if and only if λ(χπ − 1) + (1− β)χz > 0 for the interest rule (4).
Thus, stability obtains if µ (and ρ) is small enough and σ2g (and σ
2
u) is not too small
in the sense made precise in the Corollary. Woodford’s calibrated values satisfy the
conditions of Corollary 11 since µ = 0.35 and σ2g = 3.72 so that, with these values, the
Taylor principle completely characterizes stability.
However, instability may arise when µ is large. The next corollary, which is also
proved in Appendix A.3, shows that the symmetric equilibriummay be rendered unstable
in this case. Before stating the result we define the following expressions
υ1 ≡
2− µ(1 + β + λϕ) + µϕ[(2− βµ)χz + 2λχπ]
µλϕ− (1− µ)(1− βµ) , (26)
υ2 ≡
1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ)
µ(1 + β + λϕ)− 2 . (27)
Corollary 12 Consider the model (8) and assume that the central bank uses RLS and
the private sector uses the SG algorithm in their learning rules. Let µ¯ be as in Corollary
10 and define
µ˜ ≡ (2β)−1[1 + β + λϕ−
p
(1 + β + λϕ)2 − 4β].
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We have µ¯ > µ˜.17 The dynamics of the economy is locally unstable under learning if
(a) (1− µ2)−1σ2g > υ1 when µ > µ˜
or
(b) (1− µ2)−1σ2g > min[v1, v2] when µ > µ¯,
where υ1, υ2 are defined in (26)-(27).
Some intuition for Corollaries 11 and 12 follows from our discussion in the previous
section. A small enough value of µ always contributes to stability in (25), which explains
Corollary 11. On the other hand, a large value of µ (together with a large σ2g) increases
the possibility of instability arising from the behavior of the private sector (since AP
has an eigenvalue more than 1) when it uses the SG algorithm, which provides some
intuition for Corollary 12, see (25).
Regarding policy response, we note that υ1, υ2 in Corollary 12 are increasing in
χπ (and χz) so that if the central bank reacts aggressively enough to inflation, the
inequalities (a) and (b) will be violated. In general, the central bank can continue to
contribute towards stability under learning by choosing large values of χπ (and χz).
For further analysis we revert to numerics for the calibrated example. When consid-
ering the performance of the two optimal rules, we note that the rules fully neutralize
the gt shock, and so we must state the conditions in terms of ρ and σ2u. We have stability
for small values of ρ with both versions of the optimal rules, as might be expected from
Corollary 11. However, instability arises with either rule when ρ and σ2u are large enough
(as expected from Corollary 12). As in Section 3.1.2, the EB-optimal rule continues to
yield stability under learning for a larger range of values of ρ and σ2u than the RE-optimal
rule. Figures 4-5 illustrate this phenomenon in the (ρ,σ2u) space with α = .1, ρ ∈ [0.7, 1)
and σ2u ∈ (0, 5]. (For values of ρ ∈ (0, 0.7) and σ2u ∈ (0, 5], we have stability with either
version of the optimal rule.) Recall that the entire region is stable in Figures 4 and 5 in
the homogenous case.
FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE
A similar picture emerges with the Taylor rules. Rules fulfilling the Taylor principle
lead to instability for large enough values of ρ or µ (as expected from the corollary
above). This is illustrated in Figure 6, where we have assumed that there is no cost
push shock as in (Woodford 1999). In Figure 6 we set σ2g = 3.72 (the calibrated value in
(Woodford 1999)) and χz = 0. Note that rules with χπ > 1 imply instability for values
of µ close to 1. Figure 7 also (re)emphasizes this instability. It plots Taylor rules in the
(χπ,σ
2
g) space with χz = 0 and µ = .9. Most of the space associated with rules satisfying
χπ > 1 yield instability.
18 (Recall that the entire region to the right of χπ = 1 is stable
in the homogenous case in Figures 6 and 7.)
FIGURES 6 AND 7 HERE
17µ˜ ≈ 0.68 with the Woodford values and is approximately 0.58 with the Clarida et al values.
18On the other hand, with µ = .35 as in (Woodford 1999) rules fulfilling the Taylor principle yield
stability under learning illustrating that the problem of instability arises only for µ close to 1.
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4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered the argument that the use of central bank internal
forecasts in monetary policy making might be a source of instability of the economy.
We studied the consequences of the use of internal forecasts for the stability of the
economy by means of the learning approach to expectations formation, in which agents
may at least temporarily have non-rational forecast functions that are corrected over
time. For the analysis we employed a standard forward looking model that is currently
the workhorse for studies of monetary policy. For modeling adaptive learning we have
focused attention of the benchmark case, where agents use standard econometric learning
procedures and they perceive the environment as stationary.
The limitations of our analysis suggest many possibilities for further research. The
model of monetary policy could be enriched and the implications of other types of
learning procedures could be studied. Moreover, our benchmark assumptions allowed us
to leave out the strategic aspects of expectations formation, which can become important
under diﬀerent informational assumptions.
While our results pertain to the specific model and specific ways of learning, they
do suggest a general lesson. In these kinds of models the learning behavior of private
agents can be a source of instability which needs to be oﬀset by appropriate policy. We
have shown that this task is more diﬃcult when policy cannot react directly to private
expectations and instead uses internal forecasts as a proxy and additional conditions
have to be met to ensure stability of the economy under learning.
The paper has looked at both some optimal policies and Taylor rules for some typical
cases of heterogenous learning. Looking at specific policies, the forecast based rule with
internal central bank forecasts, recently suggested by (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b),
performed well more robustly than the other formulations of optimal discretionary policy.
However, that policy - as well as learnable Taylor rules - may not be stable under
heterogenous learning for some parameter configurations.
Based on our analysis, we can make the following general suggestions for the conduct
of good monetary policy on the part of the central bank.
First, the interest rate rule should satisfy the Taylor principle. Our analysis supports
this suggestion since, with forward looking rules, the Taylor principle is equivalent to
E-stability of the equilibrium and it is always a necessary condition for convergence of
the economy under heterogenous learning.
Second, the central bank should take incoming information about the economy se-
riously and put suﬃcient weight on these indicators while setting its interest rate rule.
This suggestion is supported by our analysis of the diﬀerences in the degree of respon-
siveness when forecast functions are updated (Section 3.1). We emphasize that our focus
has been on the use of incoming information in the updating of the internal forecasting.
Naturally, there are further aspects of fine tuning in practice, e.g. getting good informa-
tion on the exogenous shocks, which we have not covered. Observation errors need not
aﬀect stability under learning, see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b). The implications of
observation errors in the data for learning could be analyzed but this must be left for
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another occasion.
Third, the bank should spend suﬃcient resources in obtaining large amount of infor-
mation about the exogenous shocks. This suggestion is supported by results in Section
3.2. It is also supported by our work in progress for cases of asymmetric information.
Informal discussions of monetary policy do tend to support these suggestions. Our
contribution has been to lend weight to these informal discussions in an analytical treat-
ment of monetary policy. We conclude by re-emphasizing the importance of the learning
approach for monetary policy design.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Corollaries 4 and 5
To shorten notation, define δ ≡ δ−1P δCB. Consider the matrix on the right hand side of
(19). Ignoring the scalar δP > 0 (which does not aﬀect the sign of the real parts of the
eigenvalues of (19)), it can be checked that one of the eigenvalues of the matrix within
parentheses on the right hand side of (19) is −δ and the remaining 3 eigenvalues are
given by the characteristic polynomial
p(m) = m3 + a1m
2 + a2m+ a3, where (28)
a1 = 1− β + δ + δϕ[χz + λ(χπ − δ−1)] ≡ 1− β + δ + ζ1,
a2 = δ(1− β) + δϕ[(2− β)χz + λ(2χπ − δ−1 − 1)] ≡ δ(1− β) + ζ2,
a3 = δϕ[(1− β)χz + λ(χπ − 1)].
where the definitions of ζ1, ζ2 are introduced to shorten notation and should be obvious
from above. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the eigenvalues of p(m) to have
negative real parts (the Routh conditions) are a1 > 0, a3 > 0, and a1a2 > a3. These
conditions imply that a2 > 0 also.
Note that a3 > 0 if and only if (1−β)χz+λ(χπ−1) > 0, which provides the necessary
condition (17) in Corollary 4. Second, a1 > 0 if and only if condition (18) in Corollary
4 is satisfied. This completes the proof of Corollary 4.
To prove Corollary 5 we first note that, when δ > 1, the Taylor principle suﬃces to
make a1 > 0. We still need to show that a1a2 > a3.
Note that ζ2 = ζ1+a3, which we use below. In addition, ζ1 and ζ2 are positive when
δ > 1. Now
a1a2 − a3 = δ(1− β)(1− β + δ) + δ(1− β)ζ1 + (1− β + δ)ζ2 + ζ1ζ2 − a3 (29)
= δ(1− β)(1− β + δ) + δ(1− β)ζ1 + (1− β + δ)(ζ1 + a3) + ζ1(ζ1 + a3)− a3
= δ(1− β)(1− β + δ) + [(δ + 1)(1− β) + δ]ζ1 + ζ21 + [(1− β + δ) + ζ1 − 1]a3
= δ(1− β)(1− β + δ) + [(δ + 1)(1− β) + δ]ζ1 + ζ21 + [δ − β + ζ1]a3.
δ > 1 suﬃces to make the coeﬃcient of a3 in the final line above positive since ζ1 > 0,
which in turn implies a1a2 − a3 > 0.
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We still need to check the matrix (16) for stability. As in (19), rewrite matrix (16)
as (by pulling out δP )
δP
µ
F ⊗AP − I F ⊗ACB
δ−1P δCBF ⊗AP δ−1P δCB(F ⊗ACB − I)
¶
(30)
and we examine the eigenvalues of the matrix within parentheses in (30). By e.g. using
Mathematica, we first note that the characteristic polynomial of this (8 × 8) matrix
is symmetric in the shocks ρ and µ, so that we may consider only the shock ρ and
the resulting 4th degree polynomial. One eigenvalue of this polynomial is −δ and the
remaining 3 eigenvalues are given by the polynomial
q(m) = m3 + b1m
2 + b2m+ b3, where (31)
b1 = 2− ρ(1 + β) + δ + δρϕ[χz + λ(χπ − δ−1)] ≡ 2− ρ(1 + β) + δ + τ 1,
b2 = (1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ[2− ρ(1 + β)] + δρϕ[(2− βρ)χz + λ(2χπ − δ−1 − 1)]
≡ (1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ[2− ρ(1 + β)] + τ 2,
b3 = δ(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δρϕ[(1− βρ)χz + λ(χπ − 1)]
≡ δ(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + τ 3,
where the definitions of τ i (i = 1, 2, 3) should again be obvious from above.
Note that τ 2 = (τ 1+τ 3), and that τ i > 0 by the Taylor principle and the assumption
that δ > 1. Next we observe that b1 > 0 and b3 > 0 also by the Taylor principle and the
assumptions 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < β < 1. We now need to determine the sign of b1b2 − b3
for which we use τ 2 = (τ 1 + τ 3) below.
b1b2 − b3 = [2− ρ(1 + β) + δ + τ 1][(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}+ τ 2]
−δ(1− ρ)(1− βρ)− τ 3
= [2− ρ(1 + β) + δ][(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] +
τ 1[(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] + τ 2[2− ρ(1 + β) + δ]
+τ 1τ 2 − δ(1− ρ)(1− βρ)− τ 3
= [2− ρ(1 + β)][(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] + δ(1− ρ)(1− βρ)
+δ2[2− ρ(1 + β)] + τ 1[(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}]
+τ 2[2− ρ(1 + β) + δ] + τ 1τ 2 − δ(1− ρ)(1− βρ)− τ 3
= [2− ρ(1 + β)][(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] + δ2[2− ρ(1 + β)]
+τ 1[(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] + (τ 1 + τ 3)[2− ρ(1 + β) + δ]
+τ 1(τ 1 + τ 3)− τ 3
= [2− ρ(1 + β)][(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] + δ2[2− ρ(1 + β)]
+τ 1[(1− ρ)(1− βρ) + δ{2− ρ(1 + β)}] + τ 1[2− ρ(1 + β) + δ + τ 1]
+τ 3[1 + δ − ρ(1 + β) + τ 1].
Note that in the final line above all terms are positive since 0 < ρ < 1, 0 < β < 1 and
δ > 1. Hence, b1b2 − b3 > 0 when δ > 1.
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Finally, when δ = 1 the stability matrices are the same as in the homogenous case
so that E-stability follows from the Taylor principle.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 10
As mentioned in the text, the conditions for stability of (23) when F ≡ µ are identical
to that of (16) or (30). Therefore, the characteristic polynomial (31), in Appendix A.1,
determines stability in this case after making the substitution δ ≡ (1− µ2)−1σ2g, so that
it takes the form
pˆ(m) = m3 + bˆ1m
2 + bˆ2m+ bˆ3, where
bˆ1 = 2− µ(1 + β + λϕ) + (1− µ2)−1σ2g[1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ)],
bˆ2 = (1− µ)(1− βµ)− µλϕ
+(1− µ2)−1σ2g[2− µ(1 + β) + µϕ{(2− βµ)χz + λ(2χπ − 1)}],
bˆ3 = (1− µ2)−1σ2g[(1− µ)(1− βµ) + µϕ{(1− βµ)χz + λ(χπ − 1)}].
in (31). The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the eigenvalues of pˆ(m) to have
negative real parts are given by bˆ1 > 0, bˆ3 > 0 and bˆ1bˆ2 > bˆ3.
The instability condition in Corollary 10 is simply bˆ1 < 0. We note that for bˆ1 < 0
it is necessary that µ > µ¯ ≡ 2(1 + β + λϕ)−1.
A.3 Proof of Corollaries 11 and 12
We first prove the inequalities
µ¯ > µ˜ > 2−1µ¯. (32)
Here µ¯ and µ˜ are defined in Corollaries 10 and 12, respectively.
Now,
µ¯ > µ˜⇔ 2
(1 + β + λϕ)
>
1 + β + λϕ−
p
(1 + β + λϕ)2 − 4β
2β
.
Rearranging and squaring, we require
(1 + β + λϕ)2 − 4β > (1 + β + λϕ)2 + 16β
2
(1 + β + λϕ)2
− 8β
or
(1 + β + λϕ)2 > 4β
or
(1− β)2 + λ2ϕ2 + 2βλϕ+ 2λϕ > 0,
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which is true, given that the parameters are all positive.
In a similar way we show that
2−1µ¯ < µ˜⇔ 1
(1 + β + λϕ)
<
1 + β + λϕ−
p
(1 + β + λϕ)2 − 4β
2β
.
Rearranging and squaring, we require
(1 + β + λϕ)2 − 4β < (1 + β + λϕ)2 + 4β
2
(1 + β + λϕ)2
− 4β
or
4β2(1 + β + λϕ)−2 > 0,
which is true.
To prove Corollary 11, we first note that necessity of the Taylor principle (1−β)χz+
λ(χπ − 1) > 0 follows from the necessity of E-stability through the matrix (22). Thus
assume that the Taylor principle holds and consider the characteristic polynomial of
the (8 × 8) matrix (25). It is again symmetric in the shocks ρ and µ, so that we may
consider only the shock µ and the resultant 4th degree polynomial. One eigenvalue of
this polynomial is −1 and the remaining 3 eigenvalues are given by the polynomial
r(m) = m3 + c1m
2 + c2m+ c3, (33)
c1 = 1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ) + {2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}(1− µ2)−1σ2g,
c2 = (1− µ2)−1σ2g[2− µ(1 + β + λϕ) + µϕ{(2− βµ)χz + 2λχπ}+
(1− µ2)−1σ2g{(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}],
c3 = (1− µ2)−2(σ2g)2[µϕ{(1− βµ)χz + λχπ}+ {(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}].
Clearly, c1 > 0 and c3 > 0 since µ < 2
−1µ¯, 0 < β, µ < 1 and the Taylor principle holds.
We still need to show that c1c2 − c3 > 0. We introduce the notation δ ≡ (1 − µ2)−1σ2g
below. We first write
c1c2 = δ{1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ)}{2− (1 + β + λϕ)µ}+ δ2{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}2 +
δµϕ{1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ)}{(2− βµ)χz + 2λχπ}+
δ2µϕ{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}{(2− βµ)χz + 2λχπ}+
δ2{1 + µϕ(χz + λχπ)}{(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}+
δ3{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}{(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}
In this expression (1 − µ)(1 − βµ) − µϕλ is positive for all µ < µ˜ and hence for all
µ < 2−1µ¯ (using (32)) since the expression µλϕ− (1− µ)(1− βµ) is increasing in µ and
is zero when µ = µ˜ so that it is negative for all µ < µ˜.
In computing c1c2− c3 we ignore first, second, third and fifth terms of the preceding
expression for c1c2 and (to economize on space) denote them only by .. while keeping in
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mind that these terms are all positive. We retain only the fourth and final (sixth) term
and obtain
c1c2 − c3 = δ2µϕ{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}{(2− βµ)χz + 2λχπ}+
δ3{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}{(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}
−δ2[µϕ{(1− βµ)χz + λχπ}+ {(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}] + ..
= δ2µϕ{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}[{(1− βµ)χz + λχπ}+ {χz + λχπ}] +
δ3{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}{(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}−
δ2[µϕ{(1− βµ)χz + λχπ}+ {(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}] + ..
= δ2µϕ{(1− βµ)χz + λχπ}{1− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}+
δ2µϕ{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}{χz + λχπ}+
δ2{(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µϕλ}[δ{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}− 1] + ..
The first two terms in the final expression are positive since µ < 2−1µ¯. Regarding the
final explicit term, it was shown above that (1−µ)(1−βµ)−µϕλ > 0 for all µ < 2−1µ¯.
Moreover, since δ ≥ 1 and µ < 2−1µ¯,
δ{2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)}− 1 ≥ 2− µ(1 + β + λϕ)− 1 = 1− µ(1 + β + λϕ) > 0,
which proves that the final term is positive. Thus c1c2− c3 > 0 (recall that the .. terms
in the expression for c1c2 − c3 above are all positive).
To prove Corollary 12, consider the characteristic polynomial (33). Assume that the
Taylor principle holds since otherwise we immediately have instability. We note that for
c1 < 0, it is necessary that µ > µ¯ and for c2 < 0, it is necessary that µλϕ− (1− µ)(1−
βµ) > 0. The rest follows, since c1 < 0 or c2 < 0 suﬃces for instability.
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